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Executive summary
In the 1990s, the Western Balkan region suffered from severe conflicts, which ended after 
intervention by United Nations and NATO forces and with the promise of accession to the 
European Union. In the early and mid-2000s, the prospect of EU accession and the global 
boom facilitated rapid economic recovery in the Western Balkans and boosted economic 
and institutional reforms. However, the global financial crisis of 2007-09 and the European 
crisis of 2010-13 slowed the pace of economic growth and amplified high unemployment. 
In addition, various unresolved legacies from past conflicts slowed the pace of reform and 
progress towards EU accession.
The European Commission in February 2018 set an indicative deadline (2025) for 
admission to the EU of the two most advanced candidates – Serbia and Montenegro. This 
could incentivise all Western Balkan countries, including those candidates that have not yet 
started membership negotiations (Macedonia and Albania) and those waiting for candidate 
status (Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo), to remove domestic political obstacles to 
EU accession, solve conflicts with neighbours, speed up reforms and accelerate economic 
growth.
The European Union and its member states must not overlook the strategic importance 
of the Western Balkan region. Geographically, Western Balkan countries form a land bridge 
and the shortest transit route between the south-east flank of the EU and its central European 
core. The importance of this transit route was demonstrated during the 2015-16 refugee crisis. 
Furthermore, Western Balkan economies are already closely integrated with the EU. The EU is 
their largest trade partner, largest source of incoming foreign investment and other financial 
flows, and the main destination for outward migration.
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1 Introduction
The Western Balkans is a geopolitical term coined by the governing bodies of the European 
Union in the early 2000s and referring to those countries in south-eastern Europe that were 
not EU members or candidates at the time but could aspire to join the bloc. Originally, the 
Western Balkan region consisted of seven countries – Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croa-
tia, Kosovo, Macedonia1, Montenegro and Serbia – but Croatia has since joined the EU. 
In the 1990s, the region suffered from severe conflicts that had negative political and eco-
nomic consequences that continue to be felt. In the early and mid-2000s, the prospect of EU 
accession and the global boom facilitated rapid economic recovery and boosted economic 
and institutional reforms in the region. However, the global financial crisis of 2007-09 and 
the subsequent European financial crisis of 2010-13 (that affected in particular the southern 
flank of the EU) slowed down the pace of economic growth in the region, and amplified high 
unemployment, especially among young people. In addition, various unresolved legacies 
from past conflicts slowed the pace of reform and progress towards EU accession in Western 
Balkan counties, and intensified nationalist sentiments across the region.
Given its geographical location, the region is important to the EU in terms of security, 
stability, trade and transit routes. Therefore, the Western Balkan countries’ economic and 
political prospects, and their future within a European framework, should remain one of the 
top priorities for the EU. 
This Policy Contribution concentrates on economic and social development in the region, 
and the economic and institutional aspects of EU accession (sections 3-6)2. Naturally, we also 
take political and geopolitical factors into consideration (section 2) but as the background 
rather than central theme of our analysis. We conclude (section 7) with broad recommenda-
tions pertinent to the possible eventual EU accession of Western Balkan countries.
2 Conflict legacies and geopolitics
Between 1918 and 1991, all Western Balkan countries except Albania were part of Yugoslavia. 
After the second world war, similarly to most of their central and eastern European neigh-
bours, the countries were under communist rule. However, in 1948 Yugoslavia split with 
the Soviet Union and remained independent from major geopolitical and military blocs in 
Europe, becoming one of the founders of the Non-Aligned Movement. After 1950, Yugoslavia 
developed a unique decentralised market socialism model based on employee-managed 
firms. Although this did not protect the country from macroeconomic disequilibria (repeated 
episodes of high inflation and hyperinflation, large external debt and high unemployment) 
it allowed the creation of quasi-market institutions and market-oriented microeconomic be-
haviour. Unlike countries of the Soviet bloc, Yugoslavia remained relatively open to the world 
in terms of trade and its citizens’ freedom to travel. 
By contrast, Albania, which also split with the Soviet Union in 1962, chose an orthodox 
model of a centrally planned economy, based on national self-sufficiency and closed to the 
outside world. 
When Yugoslavia began to collapse in 1991, most of its successor states suffered from 
violent ethnic conflicts, which negatively affected the entire region in terms of war damage, 
1   Because of the conflict with Greece over the country’s name (see sections 2 and 6), international organisations and the 
EU use the temporary name ‘the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’ (FYROM). However, for the sake of editorial 
simplicity, we use the short name ‘Macedonia’.
2   As the basis for analysis, we rely on data from the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, UNCTAD, UNECE and 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Unfortunately, data for Kosovo remains incomplete.
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human suffering, disrupted trade links, refugee flows, sanctions, organised crime and so on. 
The series of civil wars in the region, which lasted throughout the 1990s, was stopped only by 
the intervention of United Nations and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) forces and 
the EU’s generous promise to allow countries in the region to apply for EU membership once 
they re-established peace and met accession criteria. The prospect of European integration 
helped to start the process of economic and political reforms, although at various speeds in 
different countries, and to largely normalise economic and political relations in the region. 
However, the legacies of past conflicts continue to overshadow regional politics and eco-
nomics, and to create obstacles in Western Balkan countries to EU integration. 
First, Serbia, five EU member states (Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain) and 
several other countries3 do not recognise Kosovo as an independent state. Internally, Kosovo 
has failed to build peaceful relationships between the Albanian majority and Serbian minor-
ity, and its domestic stability relies on international peacekeeping forces. 
Second, Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the civil war was brought to an end by the Dayton 
Agreement in 1995, is a very loose two-tier confederation of three ethnic communities that is 
hardly manageable at the central level (ICG, 2012). Politics in those communities continues 
to be dominated by nationalist sentiments. As a result, the international community must 
continue its peacekeeping mission and state-building support more than 20 years after the 
end of the war. 
Third, Greece disputes Macedonia’s country name4 and this conflict has frozen the coun-
try’s EU and NATO accession process for more than decade. Internally, Macedonia has suf-
fered periodically from ethnic tensions between the Macedonian majority and the Albanian 
minority. Furthermore, the ten-year term of former prime minister Nikola Gruevski (1996-
2006) was marred by numerous violations of the rule of law and political and civil liberties. 
All countries in the region face problems with corruption (see section 5) and organised 
crime. The roots of the latter can be tracked back, at least partly, to the conflicts of 1990s and 
the resulting UN sanctions. 
All the above-mentioned legacies of past conflicts contribute to the slow pace of the EU 
accession process in the region. In addition, EU members’ appetites for further enlarge-
ment have been reduced by the financial crisis years (2007-13) and associated social and 
political tensions, the wave of Euroscepticism and nationalism, and Brexit. 
However, there are signs of a changing atmosphere. First, in his State of the Union 
Address of 13 September 20175, European Commission president Jean-Claude Juncker 
recognised the strategic importance of further enlargement once the candidate countries 
meet the accession criteria. Second, the new enhanced Western Balkan strategy elaborated 
by the European Commission (2018) sets 2025 as a possible time horizon for Montenegrin 
and Serbian accession. 
This is good news because the slow pace of the accession process and the lack of enthusi-
asm among current EU members to accept new entrants might weaken incentives for further 
reforms in Western Balkan countries, reverse those already in place and derail the enlarge-
ment process, as already happened partly with Turkey. In turn, this could mean a serious risk 
of a new round of intra-regional conflicts6, and geopolitical destabilisation in the EU’s closest 
neighbourhood. 
Faced by such risks, the EU and its member states must not overlook the strategic impor-
tance of the Western Balkan region. 
3   Including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Nigeria, Russia, South Africa, Ukraine and most 
countries of the former Soviet Union.
4   Macedonia is the name of Greece’s northern region. Greece also questions the right of Macedonia to refer to the historical 
memory of Alexander the Great (Gligorov, 2018).  
5   See: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-17-3165_en.pdf.
6   Some of those conflicts – between Serbia and Kosovo for example – have been at least partly mitigated in recent years 
thanks to active EU diplomacy and incentives created by the prospect of EU membership. 
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Geographically, Western Balkan countries form a land bridge and the shortest transit route 
between the south-east flank of the EU (Greece, Bulgaria and Romania) and its central Euro-
pean ‘core’ (Hungary, Croatia, Slovenia and Austria). The importance of this transit area was 
demonstrated during the 2015-16 refugee crisis. Close cooperation between the Western Balkan 
governments and the EU played a major role in closing the Balkan route to refugee flows. 
Because of its geographical location, and long and complicated land borders with its West-
ern Balkan neighbours, Croatia could be the major beneficiary of further enlargement. The only 
road connection between its southern and central parts (the Adriatic highway) goes through the 
territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is an obstacle to Croatia joining the Schengen area. 
Economically, the EU is the largest trade partner of the Western Balkan countries, the 
main source of inward foreign direct investment and the main destination for outward labour 
migration (section 4). Many European countries have a sizeable Western Balkan diaspora. 
The geopolitical vacuum created by the delayed prospect of EU membership and decreas-
ing EU interest in the region could also encourage other players, such as Russia and China 
(Fouere, 2017), to become more active. To limited extent, this has already happened. China 
finances an increasing number of infrastructure projects throughout central and eastern 
Europe, including Western Balkans (Kynge and Peel, 2017; Byrne and Mitchell, 2017). 
Russia’s engagement in the region concentrates on geopolitical goals. In particular, Russia 
wants to discourage Western Balkan countries from joining NATO and is not enthusiastic 
about their EU membership bids. Serbia is a major target for Russian efforts because of histor-
ical and cultural links between the two countries (Hartwell and Sidlo, 2017). However, Serbia 
has been reluctant to take any step that would damage its EU accession prospects and openly 
distance it from mainstream EU foreign policy. The exception in this respect is its refusal to 
join EU sanctions against Russia (in retaliation for the annexation of Crimea and Russia’s 
involvement in the Donbass conflict). 
Beyond Serbia, there was some evidence of Russia’s involvement in the failed coup plot in 
Montenegro in October 2016, which was seen by the ruling Democratic Party of Socialists as 
the attempt to stop Montenegro’s accession to NATO (Hopkins, 2017). 
Turkey, another historical player in the region, is active in the economic and cultural 
sphere, especially in Albania, Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina. It also has the ambition 
playoff playing an active peacebuilding role in the region (Bechev, 2012).
3 Macroeconomic and social performance
3.1 Income per capita
In 2016, all Western Balkan countries except Kosovo were classified according to the World 
Bank Atlas method as upper middle-income countries. This category includes countries with 
gross national income (GNI) per capita between $3,956 and $12,235. However, most Western 
Balkan countries are towards the bottom of this income group – between $4,180 in Albania 
and $5,310 in Serbia. Even Montenegro with the region’s highest GNI per capita ($7,120) 
recorded approximately only one sixth of German and one fifth of EU average GNI per capita. 
Kosovo, the region’s poorest country with GNI per capita of $3,850, belonged to a lower mid-
dle-income economy group.
Nevertheless, since 2000 the Western Balkan region has seen income per-capita conver-
gence towards Western European levels, represented in our analysis by Germany7 (Figure 1). 
7   We chose Germany as a benchmark because of its roles as the largest EU national economy and as a major economic and 
trade partner of Western Balkan economies. Germany also had a largely positive but rather modest rate of growth in the 
2000s and 2010s.
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Figure 1: GDP per capita in current international $, PPP adjusted, Germany = 100%, 
2000-16
Source: World Economic Outlook database, October 2017. Note: IMF staff estimates for Kosovo (the entire period), Albania (2012-16) and Montenegro (2016)
Figure 2: Real GDP growth, annual percent change, 2000-16
Source: World Economic Outlook database, October 2017.
The income convergence process was particularly strong between 2000 and 2009, on the 
back of rapid economic growth in the region (Figure 2) and the global economic boom. The gap 
in income per-capita levels in purchasing power parity (PPP) between Serbia and Germany 
narrowed by 10.5 percentage points, between Albania and Germany by 9.1 percentage points 
and between Montenegro and Germany by 7.7 percentage points. Other countries converged 
at a slower pace – Bosnia and Herzegovina by 5.6 percentage points, Macedonia by 4.7 percent-
age points and Kosovo by only 2.2 percentage points. After 2010, convergence slowed as result 
of the spillover effects of the global and European financial crises. The 2010-12 period brought 
even de-convergence, compared to the 2009 relative income per capita level. Since 2012-13, 
convergence has restarted but at slower pace than in the 2000s. By 2016, Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and Serbia had still not managed to regain the relative income per capita level (as compared to 
Germany) of 2009. 
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Overall, between 2000 and 2016 Albania saw the biggest progress in income per capita con-
vergence (by 10.5 percentage points) followed by Serbia (9.6 percentage points), Montenegro (8.3 
percentage points), Macedonia (6.2 percentage points), Bosnia and Herzegovina (5.3 percentage 
points) and Kosovo (3.4 percentage points). The political and geopolitical factors discussed in 
section 2 have had at least partial impacts on the observed differences in the pace of convergence. 
3.2 Social challenges
Despite progress in income convergence, the Western Balkan region continues to face social 
risks associated with poverty, income inequality, unemployment – especially among young 
people – and other forms of social exclusion. 
Table 1 shows there has been some progress in the Western Balkans since 2001 in reducing 
poverty gaps8 at $1.90, $3.20 and $5.50 a day (in 2011 PPP). For Macedonia, the proportion of 
people living below the thresholds of $1.90 and $3.20 almost halved after 2010. Substantial 
reductions in the percentage of people living below the thresholds of $3.20 and $5.50 a day 
were also accomplished in Kosovo (2013 compared to 2005). In Serbia, the percentage of 
people living below all three thresholds was largely unchanged between 2002 and 2013. In 
Montenegro, there was even some deterioration for the highest threshold, probably as result 
of the global and European financial crises. However, in both Serbia and Montenegro, poverty 
figures remain low compared to their Western Balkan neighbours. 
Table 1: Poverty gap at $1.90, $3.20 and $5.50 a day (2011 PPP), in percent
Poverty gap at $1.90 a day $3.20 a day $5.50 a day
2005 2010 2013 2005 2010 2013 2005 2010 2013
Albania 0.2 0.1b 0.2d 2.2 1.1b 1.6d 12.4 9.0b 10.3d
Bosnia & Herzegovina 0.1a 0.0c 0.2a 0.1c 1.0a 0.8c
Macedonia 4.3 3.5 8.0 6.5 15.9 13.0
Kosovo 0.6 0.3 0.2 4.2 2.8 0.9 17.7 13.9 5.8
Montenegro 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.9 2.1 0.8 2.4
Serbia 0.3 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.3 0.3 5.0 2.1 2.0
Source: World Bank’s World Development Indicators. Note: a = 2004, b = 2008, c = 2011, d = 2012. See footnote 8 for poverty gap definition.
In terms of income inequality, the region does not differ from the rest of Europe, ie its Gini index 
represents a moderate level. The exception was Macedonia in 2010, where a high Gini index of 42.8 
was recorded (Figure 3), but it declined to 28.5 in 2013. Changes in the Gini index in the region have 
not followed a single trend: it has remained broadly stable in Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
but has fluctuated somewhat in other countries. World Bank (2017) attributes these trends to prob-
lems with job creation prior to 2009, combined with low productivity in most sectors. 
This points to the inefficiency of labour market institutions in Western Balkan countries, 
one of the legacies of employee self-management in the former Yugoslavia (Roaf et al, 2014). As 
result, the region has been always characterised by very high unemployment rates, even before 
the transition started. 
Figure 4 shows that in 2001, the unemployment rate in Kosovo approached 60 percent of 
the labour force. Since then, Kosovo’s labour market had improved: its unemployment rate in 
2016 was only half the 2001 level, but still close to 30 percent. Macedonia has been the West-
ern Balkans’ second-highest unemployment country, with the unemployment rate exceeding 
30 percent of labour force for the most of the examined period and only recently decreasing. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina has seen only very slow improvements in its unemployment rate 
since 2006 and had a similar level of unemployment in 2016 to Kosovo and Macedonia. 
8  Defined as the mean shortfall in income or consumption from the respective poverty line (counting the non-poor as having 
a zero shortfall), expressed as a percentage of that poverty line.
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Figure 3: Western Balkans, Gini indices
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators.
Figure 4: Unemployment, total (% of total labour force)
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators. Note: national estimates.
Albania has been the best performing country in this respect (perhaps thanks to the 
absence of the legacy of the Yugoslav employee self-management model), with an average 
unemployment rate equal to approximately 15 percent of the labour force. 
One might argue that high unemployment results from the informal labour market, which 
is in turn driven by high taxes and regulatory barriers (section 5). Based on Business Envi-
ronment and Enterprise Performance Survey data, several studies (eg Koettl-Brodmann et 
al, 2017) conclude that barriers to entry for new firms, and other regulatory impediments, 
contribute to high unemployment in the region.
Table 2 shows unemployment rates per educational level. It is notable that better educa-
tion has not increased the likelihood of being employed in the Western Balkans (unlike in 
Germany, which serves as a benchmark) except for the very recent period (2016), when the 
unemployment rate for people with advanced education markedly declined in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Kosovo. In Albania, the unemployment rate of people with basic education 
is systematically lower than the rate for those with intermediate and advanced education 
levels. These findings might suggest a substantial role for the informal labour market (regard-
less of education level) and a mismatch between education profile and quality and actual 
demand for labour. 
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Table 2: Unemployment rates for people with basic, intermediate and advanced 
education (% of total labour force in respective education group)
Basic
Country 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Albania       12.6   11.2 9.1 10.5 10.8 11.5  
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina
                35.0   9.0
Macedonia 43.29 42.7 40.5 40.0 36.6 33.2 31.3 31.2 29.8 26.3 26.1
Kosovo                 49.0 39.5 47.6
Montenegro           31.3 35.0        
Serbia       20.8 26.9 29.7 30.9 27.6 22.5 19.4 14.9
Germany 17.5 15.9 14.2 13.8 12.8 11.7 10.9 10.1 9.9 9.5 8.7
Intermediate
Country 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Albania       19.7   18.7 14 16.8 20.7 22.9  
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina
                33.9 35.0 7.9
Macedonia 38.4 36.3 34.1 32.6 33.4 31.7 31.9 28.9 29.8 25.8 22.7
Kosovo                 45.2 41.1 36.7
Montenegro           20.5 21.7        
Serbia       19.4 22.0 25.3 26.5 26.1 21.79 20.5 18.3
Germany 9.6 8.2 7.2 7.0 6.2 5.3 4.9 4.7 4.2 3.8 3.3
Advanced
Country 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Albania       18.6   18.4 20.8 15.8 18.2 21.5  
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina
                22.2 20.8 11.6
Macedonia 22.9 23.2 23.7 24.8 24.8 26.3 26.0 26.7 24.6 22.6 21.0
Kosovo                 27.1 28.0 8.2
Montenegro           13.8 11.6        
Serbia       10.7 12.9 16.0 17.9 18.8 16.8 17.0 14.8
Germany 5.3 4.5 3.9 3.7 3.2 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.8 2.5 2.3
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators.
Figure 5: Youth unemployment, % of labour force aged 15-24
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Figure 6: Birth rate, crude (per 1,000 people)
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The region also suﬀers from very high youth unemployment rates (Figure 5), which signif-
icantly exceed the overall unemployment rates (Figure 4). The highest youth unemployment 
rates are recorded in Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina, while Montenegro and Serbia 
have the lowest. However, even the Serbian and Montenegrin rates (the lowest in the region 
in 2016) are about five times and twice as high as in Germany and the EU respectively. Lack of 
employment opportunities for young people creates incentives for them to emigrate to more 
developed countries with better functioning labour markets and more job opportunities. 
Emigration adds to the already unfavourable demographic trends in the region (see sec-
tion 4). The Western Balkan population is shrinking and aging. The median age of the Western 
Balkans region is 8.7 years above the world average and is expected to increase in the future 
(World Bank, 2017). Figure 6 shows that the birth rate has decreased by approximately three 
births per 1000 people on average in the region from 2000 to 2015. The largest decreases in the 
numbers of births have been recorded in Kosovo, Albania and Montenegro. However, Kosovo 
and Albania continue to have the highest birth rates. In the face of these unfavourable demo-
graphic trends, labour productivity would need to increase significantly to oﬀset the future 
deficit in the working age population. Pension, healthcare and long-term care systems must 
be also adjusted to the new demographic reality. 
3.3 Monetary policy regimes and inflation
Four Western Balkan countries do not conduct sovereign monetary policy. Kosovo and Mon-
tenegro use the euro as their currency, Bosnia and Herzegovina has a euro-denominated cur-
rency board, and Macedonia pegs to euro (in a relatively narrow horizontal band)9. Exchange 
rate regimes in Albania and Serbia can be characterised as managed float and both countries 
declare inflation targeting frameworks (IMF, 2016, Table 2).  
In the second half of the 1990s and the early 2000s, pegs to the German mark and then to the 
euro helped Croatia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and also Montenegro and Kosovo to 
disinflate quickly, given their legacies of high inflation/hyperinflation in the early 1990s10. How-
ever, from 2003-17 (Figure 7), the choice of monetary regime seemed to be less important from 
this point of view. 
9   IMF (2016, Table 2) classifies the exchange rate regime of Macedonia as the ‘stabilised arrangement’ anchored to the euro. 
10  Serbia and Montenegro, which formed the new Yugoslav federation in 1992, suffered from the second fastest hyperinfla-
tion in world history. Over 25 months between January 1992 and February 1994, its consumer price index increased by a 
factor of 78,000,000,000,000,000,000,000! (Koen and De Masi, 1997).
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Despite its inflation targeting framework, Serbia was the worst performer (at least until 2013), 
but Albania with the same regime recorded the lowest and most stable inflation in the region. 
Kosovo, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina experienced significant volatility. To a lesser 
degree, this was also true for Macedonia. This means that small open economies, which have 
given up their monetary sovereignty, experience more volatile inflation because of its exogenous 
character driven by real and financial shocks to external markets and changes in exchange rates 
between major currencies. However, it is fair to say that from 2014-17, all Western Balkan coun-
tries converged to low and relatively stable inflation rates.
Figure 7: Inflation, end-of-period consumer prices
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Source: IMF World Economic Outlook database, October 2017.
Monetary regimes can really matter for financial stability. All Western Balkan countries, 
regardless their declared and actual monetary regimes, are heavily euro-ised (Table 3; note this 
data does not include euro or dollar cash holdings). This is not a problem in Kosovo and Montene-
gro, where the euro has been adopted as the official national currency, but it is a serious vulnera-
bility in other countries. 
Table 3: Share of foreign-exchange denominated liabilities and loans in total liabilities 
in loans, %, 2006-16
Foreign-exchange denominated 
liabilities
Foreign-exchange denominated 
loans
2006 2010 2013 2016 2006 2010 2013 2016
Albania 50.5 50.0 52.1 68.6 61.9 57.8
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina
62.8 67.0 63.8 57.4 71.0 70.0 68.8 62.6
Kosovo   4.6 4.6     0.2 0.1  
Macedonia 56.9 57.6 50.2 46.3 52.7 58.8 52.7 44.9
Serbia 76.7 71.1 71.6 69.4
Source: IMF Financial Soundness Indicators for Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia, IMF (2017c, Table 8) for Serbia. Note: 
data for Montenegro is not available. 
Furthermore, despite successful disinflation and repeated recommendations from the IMF 
(see, for example, IMF, 2017a, b, c) there has been no visible progress in reducing euro-isation 
(Table 3) in favour of assets and liabilities in national currencies. From that perspective a hard peg 
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(unilateral euro-isation or a credible currency board) can be seen as the factor that increases 
financial stability (thanks to the elimination of currency depreciation risk) and recognises 
high exposure of the region to euro-denominated transactions in trade, tourist services and 
remittance flows, among others. 
3.4 Fiscal accounts
Most Western Balkan countries managed to maintain fiscal surpluses during the pre-crisis 
period of the early and mid-2000s, with the exception of Albania, which ran continuous high 
general government deficits until 2014 (Table 4). However, since 2008, the situation has dete-
riorated everywhere, though Bosnia and Herzegovina has suffered less than others. There was 
some improvement in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia in 2016-17. 
Table 4: General government net lending/borrowing, percent of GDP, 2000-17
Country
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
20
15
20
16
20
17
Albania -5.0 -5.2 -3.5 -3.3 -3.2 -4.9 -6.6 -3.5 -3.5 -3.4 -5.2 -5.5 -4.1 -1.8 -1.2
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina -0.4 -0.2 0.8 2.1 0.2 -3.9 -5.3 -4.1 -2.7 -2.7 -1.9 -2.9 -0.2 0.4 -0.4
Macedonia -0.1 0.4 0.2 -0.5 0.6 -0.9 -2.6 -2.4 -2.5 -3.8 -3.8 -4.2 -3.5 -2.6 -3.5
Kosovo 1.6 -4.6 -3.1 2.7 7.0 -0.2 -0.6 -2.2 -1.8 -2.6 -3.1 -2.6 -1.9 -1.4 -3.4
Montenegro -4.0 -2.4 -1.4 4.4 8.5 -2.3 -6.7 -4.9 -6.7 -5.8 -4.5 -0.7 -5.9 -6.0 -6.4
Serbia -2.7 0.1 1.1 -1.0 -0.9 -1.9 -3.6 -3.7 -4.1 -6.8 -5.3 -6.2 -3.6 -1.2 -1.0
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook database, October 2017.
Changes in fiscal balances have had an impact on the level of general government gross 
debt to GDP (Figure 8). In particular, the global financial crisis of 2008-09 reversed the pre-
vious trend of decreasing debt-to-GDP ratios. As result, in 2016, general government gross 
debt exceeded 70 percent of GDP in Albania, Montenegro and Serbia, posing a serious risk to 
their fiscal sustainability. The very high levels of general government gross debt of Serbia in 
the early 2000s (225 percent of GDP in 2000) was a legacy of the 1990s with its economic and 
political turmoil, UN sanctions and engagement in violent regional conflicts.
Figure 8: General government gross debt, % of GDP, 2000-16
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook database, October 2017.
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4 External economic relations and the role 
of the EU
4.1 Trade
Trade and economic integration with the EU have been major growth factors in transition 
economies since the beginning of the 1990s (Roaf et al, 2014). This was also the case for the 
Western Balkan region after the end of the 1990s political and economic turmoil. 
At first glance, Western Balkan countries’ imports and exports seem to represent high 
shares of GDP (Figures 9 and 10). However, such an observation might not tell us the entire 
story. 
First, high shares of exports and imports relative to GDP are a natural phenomenon in 
small economies. When compared to three small economies that joined the EU in 2004 and 
have since introduced the euro (Slovenia, Slovakia and Estonia) the differences, especially 
on the export side, are visible. Even if the gap has been reduced since 2000 (Figure 11), there 
is still a long way to go to catch up with benchmark countries, especially for Kosovo, Albania 
and Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
Second, in some cases (Montenegro, Macedonia, Albania) imports and exports relative to 
GDP have been volatile, not only during the global financial crisis (2008-09), which affected 
negatively almost all analysed countries. 
Figure 9: Imports of goods and services, % of GDP, 2000-16
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators.
Figure 10: Exports of goods and services, % of GDP, 2000-16
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators.
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Third, the comparison of import and export shares relative to GDP (Figures 9 and 10) 
makes clear that all Western Balkan countries run large trade deficits, which are only partly 
compensated for by positive factor income balances, mainly flows of labour remittances 
(section 4.2 and Table 6). Large current account imbalances (Figure 12), especially in Mon-
tenegro, have been historically financed by inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI, section 
4.3 and Table 7) and official development aid (ODA, section 4.4 and Figure 16). However, 
the volume of ODA has been diminishing over time and the net private capital inflows also 
went down after the global financial crisis of 2008-09. Therefore, current account and trade 
balances have had to adjust and this has been achieved by faster growth of exports than of 
imports (Figure 11). 
Figure 11: Value of imports and exports, 2000-16, 2000=100
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators.
Nevertheless, Montenegro’s current account deficits continued to be very high by inter-
national comparison, even after the 2008-09 crisis. They increased again in 2015-16 once 
economic recovery started. 
Figure 12: Current account balances, % of GDP, 2001-16
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook database, October 2017. Note: 2016 data for Kosovo and Montenegro contains IMF staff estimates.
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According to the World Bank (2017), services account for more than two thirds of the total 
exports of goods and services, with an overall low export sophistication. In 2013, according to the 
UNCTAD trade database, travel and tourism played a major role in service exports from Albania, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro, while other services dominated services exports from 
Macedonia and Serbia (data for Kosovo was missing). Other services were also the largest item in 
the structure of service imports in all countries except Albania, where travel and tourist services 
dominated the import side. 
Figures 13 and 14 show that the EU and Western Balkan neighbours are the dominant trade part-
ners of each Western Balkan country, accounting together to at least 70 percent of their total trade. 
For Western Balkan countries’ exports, this dominance is even stronger. That is, the region is already 
closely integrated with the EU in terms of trade links, even if the EU’s share has declined slightly 
compared to 2006
Among other partners, Russia has played some role in supplying the region, especially Serbia, 
Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, with energy resources (oil and gas) but Russia’s role has 
gradually diminished over time (despite Russia’s interest in the Western Balkans energy sector and 
the Druzhba and Adrian pipelines). Russia is also one of the destinations for Serbian exports, but not 
exceeding a few percent of the total. 
The shares of China and Turkey are also limited and concentrated on the import side. However, 
the growth in imports from both countries is very high, so their shares might increase in future. 
Figure 13: Geographical structure of imports, % of total, 2016
Source: International Trade Center (Trade Map). Note: Kosovo is omitted because of missing data.
Figure 14: Geographical structure of exports, % of total, 2016
Source: International Trade Center (Trade Map). Note: Kosovo is omitted because of missing data.
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4.2 Outward migration and labour remittances
Not surprisingly, a large proportion of the Western Balkan population has emigrated to 
more developed countries (in particular to western and northern Europe), as a result of the 
violent conflicts of the 1990s, lower income per capita and chronic high unemployment, es-
pecially of young people (see section 3). Mass emigration started in 1960s from the former 
Yugoslavia and in the early 1990s from Albania. Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina had 
the largest number and shares of their nationals living abroad in 201511 (Table 5). 
Table 5: Total migrant stock, number of people and % of population, 2015
Country of origin Albania
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina
Montenegro Serbia Macedonia
Migrants stock 
worldwide 2015
1,122,910 1,650,772 138,356 964,585 516,024
Percent of 
population
38.4 46.7 22.0 10.9 24.8
Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2015). Trends in International Migrant Stock: 
Migrants by Destination and Origin (United Nations database, POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2015), United Nations, Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs, Population Division (2017). World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision, DVD Edition and authors’ calculations – see 
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates15.shtml. Note: Estimates for migrants refer to 
the total number of international migrants by country of origin and refer to 1 July of the reference year (2015). In estimating the interna-
tional migrant stock, international migrants have been equated with the foreign-born population whenever this information is available. 
Personal remittances play an important economic and social role in all Western Balkan 
countries except Macedonia (Table 6). In Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina their share 
of GDP exceeds 10 percent; in Albania, Montenegro and Serbia they amount to slightly less 
than 10 percent. Since 2000, their relative importance has gradually decreased in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Albania and Macedonia, while it has increased in Montenegro 
and remained broadly stable in Serbia. 
Table 6: Personal remittances, received, % of GDP
Country
20
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20
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20
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20
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20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
20
15
20
16
Albania 16.4 17.2 16.5 15.5 15.9 15.8 15.1 13.7 14.5 14.3 13.4 12 11.5 8.6 8.6 9.2 8.9
B&H 28.7 26.1 22.5 20.8 20.5 18.2 16.7 17 14.2 12.1 10.6 10.5 10.7 10.7 11.4 11.1 10.9
Kosovo         17.1 18.8 18.9 19 18.3 18.7 17.3 14.9 14.6 14 14.9 15.1 14.8
Montenegro               5.4 6.6 7.3 8.1 8.8 9.7 9.5 9.4 9.4 9.1
Macedonia, 2.1 2 2.6 3.5 3.7 3.6 3.9 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1 4 3.5 3.2 3.1 2.7
Serbia               9.3 7.2 10.9 10.4 8.5 8.7 8.8 8.4 9.1 8.4
Source: World Bank’s World Development Indicators. Note: Personal remittances comprise personal transfers and compensation of employees. 
4.3 Foreign direct investment 
The Western Balkans’ deep economic integration with the EU is seen not only in terms of 
trade and migration (sections 4.2-4.3), but also in investment. Most FDI in Western Balkan 
countries, except Kosovo, originates from the EU (Figure 15). Progress in EU accession might 
bring even more European FDI (Stehrer and Holzner, 2018). 
Other major sources of FDI in the Western Balkans include Switzerland (entire region), 
Canada (Albania), Serbia (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro), Russia (Montenegro, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia), Turkey (Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia) and Norway (Serbia) 
(Hunya and Schwarzhappel, 2016). 
11  The numbers do not include short-term (seasonal) labour migrants.
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Figure 15: Share of the EU28 in the total stock of FDI in Western Balkan countries, 
%, 2014
Source: Hunya and Schwarzhappel (2016).
Figure 16: Stock of inward FDI, % of GDP, 2016
Source: UNCTAD, http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/TableViewer/tableView.aspx. 
Despite the lost decade of the 1990s, FDI inflows into Western Balkan countries acceler-
ated in the 2000s and 2010s, including the period following the 2008-09 global financial crisis 
(Table 7)12. As result, the cumulative stock of inward FDI relative to GDP exceeds the average 
in transition economies (Figure 16). Montenegro is the absolute leader with the stock of FDI 
in 2016 equal to 113.0 percent of GDP.
FDI has mainly been directed at the financial sector, telecommunications, the energy 
sector, wholesale and retail, construction, real estate and manufacturing (Estrin and Uvalic, 
2016; Hunya and Schwarzhappel, 2016). For example, the region’s banking sector is owned 
largely by foreign investors, predominantly from the EU. Many banks in Western Balkan coun-
tries are part of pan-European banking groups. 
12  Bosnia and Herzegovina is the exception. After the 2008-09 crisis, lower FDI inflows to this country seem to have reflected 
its domestic political troubles (see section 2) and delayed prospect of EU accession. 
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Table 7: Inward FDI, annual flows, % of GDP, 2000-16
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
20
15
20
16
Albania 5.3 3.1 3.2 4.8 3.3 3.6 6.2 7.6 8.3 8.8 6.8 6.9 9.9 8.4 8.2 9.2
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina
2.0 3.8 4.4 4.9 5.5 6.0 11.5 5.2 1.4 2.4 2.7 2.3 1.5 2.9 1.7 1.7
Montenegro 21.1 36.6 18.4 12.3 15.2 10.0 10.8 17.4 5.5
Serbia 7.2 6.0 3.7 9.3 2.7 3.9 3.9 5.4 5.2
Serbia & 
Montenegro
1.1 2.8 5.8 3.4 6.5 13.1 11.0
Macedonia 12.1 2.3 5.7 1.5 6.3 8.3 5.9 2.1 2.3 4.6 1.5 3.1 2.4 2.4 3.9
Transition 
economies
1.9 2.0 2.9 3.5 2.9 4.3 4.9 5.1 3.5 3.0 2.9 2.2 2.8 2.0 1.9 3.6
Source: UNCTAD, http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/TableViewer/tableView.aspx. 
4.4 Official development assistance
In the early 2000s, Western Balkan countries received large amounts of ODA (Figure 17), 
reflecting the desire of the international community to support their post-conflict recovery 
and reconstruction, the transition to democracy and the market economy, and their integra-
tion with the EU (sections 2 and 6). However, with progress in economic convergence (section 
3.1), the size of ODA flows gradually diminished to between 0.9-3.0 percent of GNI in 2016, 
except for Kosovo, where they still amounted to 6.7 percent of GNI (having declined from 13.9 
percent of GNI in 2009). 
Figure 17: Net inflows of ODA, % of GNI
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators.
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5 Institutional challenges 
The Western Balkan region lags behind other central and eastern European countries (those 
that already joined the EU) in terms of institutional reforms. As noted by the World Bank 
(2017, pp. 19-20), by 2013, Western Balkan countries had made the same progress in reforms, 
measured by the EBRD transition scores, as the group of smaller central and eastern Europe-
an countries13 had by 1996 (Figure 18).
Figure 18: Average EBRD transition scores: Western Balkans and central and 
eastern European countries*
Source: Bruegel based on EBRD. Notes: EBRD transition score is calculated as the simple average of six EBRD indicators: price liberalisa-
tion, trade and foreign exchange system, small-scale privatisation, large scale privatisation, governance and enterprise restructuring, and 
competition policy, each rated on a scale from 1 (no reform) to 4.33 (maximum reform). Data for Kosovo is missing. * Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia.
Before 1991, the Western Balkan countries were moving faster on reforms than the group 
of smaller central and eastern European countries (Figure 18) thanks to the legacy of the 
Yugoslav ‘market socialism’ system. However, the political and economic turmoil of 1990s 
changed the situation and the Western Balkan countries have since lagged behind. Sanfey et 
al (2016) offer an optimistic prediction, arguing the Western Balkans can narrow the gap in 
the coming years under the right circumstances. 
Table 8: Ease of Doing Business, rankings out of 190, 2018
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Albania 65 45 106 157 103 42 20 125 24 120 41
B&H 86 175 166 122 97 55 62 137 37 71 40
Macedonia 11 22 26 53 48 12 4 29 27 35 30
Montenegro 42 60 78 127 76 12 51 70 44 42 37
Serbia 43 32 10 96 57 55 76 82 23 60 48
Kosovo 40 10 122 106 34 12 89 45 48 49 49
Source: World Bank Doing Business 2017 survey, http://www.doingbusiness.org/Rankings. 
Delayed reforms have a negative impact on the business climate and the entire institu-
tional environment, slowing down economic convergence with the EU and the EU accession 
process. However, not all global surveys rate Western Balkan economies unfavourably. For 
13  Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia.
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example, the annual World Bank Doing Business 2018 survey ranks Macedonia eleventh 
globally and second in the Europe and Central Asia region (that is, among all transition 
economies). Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia respectively occupy the 40th, 42nd and 43rd 
positions in this ranking. Bosnia and Herzegovina is the worst regional performer (86th 
place) but is still better than many economies of the former Soviet Union (Table 8). 
Table 8 shows that Macedonia is one of the easiest economies when it comes to protect-
ing minority investors or getting credit. Serbia proved to be the best among transition econ-
omies in dealing with construction permits, and Montenegro is also ranked high in terms 
of access to credit. Starting a business is relatively easy in Kosovo. However, Western Balkan 
countries do not perform well in registering a property or getting electricity. On average, 
the region still lags behind the groups of smaller central and eastern European countries 
(World Bank, 2017). 
Unlike the World Bank Doing Business survey, which concentrates on length, simplic-
ity and costs of administrative procedures, the Heritage Foundation Index of Economic 
Freedom pays more attention to more fundamental factors such as economic liberalisation, 
property rights, corruption and government integrity. Figure 19 shows that Western Balkan 
countries perform especially badly in terms of government integrity, judicial effectiveness 
and labour freedom. All those indicators point to inefficiency in the public sector. Indi-
cators of business freedom (except Macedonia and Albania) and property rights are also 
lagging. 
Figure 19: Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom by components, 2017
Source: Heritage Foundation, https://www.heritage.org/index/explore. Note: The score range is 1-100. The higher the score, the better is the 
country performance.
Corruption remains a major problem in the Western Balkans, reflected in the Transpar-
ency International Corruption Perception Index (Table 9). Most countries slightly improved 
their ranking in 2016 compared to 2015: they were ranked between 64 (Montenegro) and 95 
(Kosovo) out of 176 countries. However, Macedonia dropped dramatically in the ranking, 
which can be seen as contradicting its favourable Doing Business rating (Table 8). 
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Table 9: Corruption Perception Index, 2015–16
Country
CPI 
2016
CPI 
2015
Score 
difference 
(2016-2015)
CPI 2016 
Rank
CPI 2015 
Rank
Rank 
difference 
(2015-2016)
Macedonia 37 42 -5 90 66 -24
Montenegro 45 44 1 64 61 -3
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina
39 38 1 83 76 -7
Serbia 42 40 2 72 71 -1
Albania 39 36 3 83 88 5
Kosovo 36 33 3 95 102 7
Source: Transparency International, https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016#table. Note: The 
index represents a scale of 1-100. Higher scores refer to lower levels of corruption.
6 Progress in EU accession
The opportunity for Euro-Atlantic integration was offered to Western Balkan countries in 1999 
in the aftermath of the Kosovo conflict. A cooperation agreement, the Stability Pact for South-
ern and Eastern Europe, was put in place in June 1999. This was an EU initiative but other 
countries (the US, Canada, Japan, Russia, Turkey, Norway and Switzerland) and a number of 
international organisations, were also involved. The pact had three major pillars – democracy, 
economy and security – and it opened the Stabilisation and Association Process (a first step 
towards potential EU membership) for the Western Balkans region. The Stability Pact was 
replaced by the Regional Cooperation Council in 200814. 
The potential eligibility of the Western Balkan countries to become EU members was 
confirmed by the Thessaloniki EU summit in June 2003. The European Council expressed ‘…
its determination to fully and effectively support the European perspective of the Western 
Balkan countries, which will become an integral part of the EU, once they meet the estab-
lished criteria’ (Council of the European Union, 2003). 
Subsequently, Stabilisation and Association Agreements, which also include provisions for 
a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA)15, were negotiated, signed and ratified 
by the EU and Western Balkan countries. The agreement with Macedonia entered into force 
in 2004, with Croatia in 2005, with Albania in 2009, with Montenegro in 2010, with Serbia in 
2013, with Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2015 and with Kosovo in 2016. 
In addition, the EU has promoted a network of horizontal free trade agreements between 
candidate countries using the umbrella of the Central European Free Trade Agreement16, 
which currently involves all six Western Balkan countries and Moldova. 
Macedonia and Croatia obtained EU candidate status in 2004, Montenegro in 2010, Serbia 
in 2012 and Albania in 2014. Croatia started membership negotiations in 2005 and completed 
them in 2011, becoming the 28th EU member on 1 July 2013. 
Montenegro started membership negotiations in 2012 and Serbia started in January 2014. 
The EU candidate status of Macedonia is frozen, notwithstanding six European Commission 
recommendations since October 2009 to open accession negotiations. The blockage has been 
14  See http://www.rcc.int/home. 
15  DCFTAs eliminate import tariffs and also non-tariff barriers. They liberalise trade in services and investment regimes, and 
involve the far-reaching harmonisation of various trade and investment-related regulations and institutions, especially in 
the areas of competition policy, state aid and public procurement (see Evans et al, 2004, for details).
16  See http://www.cefta.int/ for details.
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Greece’s reservations over the country’s name and domestic rule of law problems (section 2). 
By December 2017, Montenegro had managed to open accession negotiations on 30 out 
of 35 chapters of the acquis communautaire (the body of EU law). The non-started chapters 
are competition policy, economic and monetary policy, environment and climate change, 
institutions and ‘other issues’. Three chapters (science and research, education and culture, 
and external relations) have been already provisionally closed17. 
Serbia is less advanced. By December 2017, it had managed to start negotiation on only 
12 chapters18 and had provisionally closed only two chapters – on science and research, and 
education and culture. 
7 Summary and conclusions
Western Balkan countries have been slow to reform compared to central European and Baltic 
countries as a consequence of the decade of devastating ethnic conflicts that followed the col-
lapse of the former Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, since 2000, the Western Balkans have managed 
to move forward on the political and economic reform fronts largely thanks to the prospect of 
EU accession that the 2003 EU Thessaloniki summit opened up for them. They have also suc-
ceeded in partial income convergence with the EU, although there is still a long way to go. In 
particular, since the start of the global financial crisis in 2008, the convergence process slowed 
and, in most countries, even temporarily went into reverse. Economic growth has started to 
accelerate again only very recently, following economic recovery in the EU. 
The slow pace of reform and the EU accession process might be disappointing for many 
and is the result of numerous unresolved legacies of the 1990s conflict era, domestic political 
setbacks and a decreasing appetite on the part of the incumbent EU member states for further 
enlargement. In this context, the recent European Commission initiative to reenergise the 
accession process and agenda, and to set an indicative deadline (2025) for admission of the 
two most advanced candidates – Serbia and Montenegro – must be welcomed (European 
Commission, 2018; see section 2).
This initiative could incentivise all countries of the region, including those candidates 
that have not yet started membership negotiations (Macedonia and Albania) and those who 
wait for candidate status (Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo), to remove domestic political 
obstacles to EU accession, solve conflicts with neighbours, speed up reforms and accelerate 
economic growth. The initiative could also help to avoid the worst-case scenario – the derail-
ing of the entire reform and European integration process (as happened with Turkey) and the 
descent again into the ethnic conflict trap. 
The initiative could create a new momentum for the partly frozen and forgotten EU 
enlargement process and complement many other initiatives aimed at consolidation of the 
EU and deeper European integration after the Brexit shock.
However, to give the new momentum a real chance of success, political will on the part of 
the EU governing bodies is not enough. Candidate and potential candidate countries must 
be ready to intensify their reform homework, including the most difficult issues of conflict leg-
acies, human rights, guarantees for ethnic, religious and other minorities, respect for the rule 
of law, full normalisation of relations with neighbours, the fight against corruption, state cap-
ture and organised crime, and the modernisation of the public administration and judiciary. 
Experience of the previous EU enlargement rounds suggests that it makes sense to address 
17  See http://www.delmne.ec.europa.eu/upload/images/poglavljaengbig.jpg. 
18  Public procurement, company law, intellectual property law, enterprise and industrial policy, judiciary and fundamental 
rights, justice, freedom and security, science and research, education and culture, customs union, external relations, finan-
cial control, and other issues
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up front the most difficult political, institutional and governance issues to avoid disappoint-
ment on both sides. This is what the European Commission (2018) is rightly suggesting in its 
Western Balkans strategy. 
However, the EU itself will also need a new round of internal institutional reforms before 
admitting more members, most of which would be small countries. 
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